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Abstract
Programming models approximate market prices and quantities when regulations constrain ﬁrm choices, because
market outcomes result when welfare is appropriately deﬁned and includes performance and environmental constraints.
This study discusses market operation in quality-constrained sectors, like gasoline and additives; processors expand
output until marginal processing cost equals the processing margin between product revenues and raw material costs;
retailers who buy gasoline and additives from processors and sell blended retail gasoline price sales at a marginal cost
that includes the blended input value plus adjustments for values of constrained attributes; and market supplies and
demands of measurable attributes like octane are balanced. This method can enhance predictions about the effects of
new policies that regulate product quality. Analysis can now include price and output adjustment in factor and product
markets, and the competitiveness of new processes and products.
r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Some energy market analyses focus on the effects of large price changes in international markets. Multi-
sector econometric models (Broadman and Hogan, 1988) or computable general equilibrium models (Uri
and Boyd, 1999; Kemfert and Welsch, 2000; Breuss and Steininger, 1998) help to evaluate the overall
consequences for a country’s energy sector and macro economy.
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Mathematical programming models also remain useful, especially when environmental or performance
constraints limit production choices in a sector. But sector models are typically extensions of ﬁrm problems.
For instance, the objective functions for energy sector analysis typically concern processor proﬁts or costs,
input prices are given, and product demands are taken as inelastic (Vlachou et al., 1996, p. 346; Manne,
1958, p. 69; Manne, 1956, p. 126). Under these assumptions, consumer price adjustments are synonymous
with ﬁrm cost adjustments. For better understanding of markets and price relationships in the presence of
environmental regulation, inelastic factor supplies and price responsive product demands should be taken
into account.
Mathematical programming models of markets have also been a mainstay in applied economic research.
These models exploit the fact that the equilibrium of a perfectly competitive market or sector is implied by
maximum welfare allocations (Samuelson, 1952, p. 292). One advantage of spatial equilibrium models is
estimation of market entry and exit prices (Takayama and Judge, 1971). Similarly, sector models evaluate
the competitiveness of value-added enterprises such as processing sectors in a market setting (McCarl and
Spreen, 1980, pp. 90–91; Takayama and Judge, 1964, p. 356).
In some cases where constraints are imposed by a government policy, market programming models
suggest that markets maximize the welfare that can be obtained with the policy in place. For instance,
Bawden (1966, p. 867), Takayama (1967), and Takayama and Judge (1971, p. 203) have shown that welfare
maximization, constrained by trade policy, is consistent with market equilibrium; many of the situations
encountered in international trade have been considered, including the ﬁxed import duty, the variable levy,
the ﬁxed export subsidy, and the ﬁxed import quota. Cox and Chavas (2000, p. 93) show the equivalence of
welfare maximization and market outcomes, when welfare is constrained by a government sanctioned
system of price wedges and the net extractions of taxes (contributions of subsidies) are subtracted from
(added to) sector welfare. Research on the relevance of programming models for situations where the
market must perform in harmony with government policy, however, is still incomplete.
This paper demonstrates the usefulness of programming models for markets where quality and
environmental restrictions impinge on market outcomes. Quality standards are an increasingly common
form of market intervention, as a means of ensuring product performance, food safety, and environmental
compatibility. The method applies to any sector with factor supply, processing, and product demand. But
fuels and additives illustrate some important regulation, quality, and pricing issues. First, a model of the
consumer demand for gasoline, the production and blending of the intermediate products (additives and
reﬁnery gasoline), and the demand/supply for inputs to gasoline production (petroleum, natural gas and
byproducts, and biomass) is discussed. Second, a welfare function and a quality restriction on the octane of
gasoline is speciﬁed for the fuel sector. The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are shown consistent with
a competitive market and the effects of the quality constraint on market pricing of gasoline is discussed.
Third, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the tractability of the programming problem, and to
indicate the effects of quality restriction on market pricing. In this fashion, we demonstrate that
programming models with quality regulation, a reﬁnery process, factor markets and product markets are
tractable, prior to undertaking large simulation experiments. Also, we shed light on factor and product
price relationships in the presence of quality or environmental restrictions.
2. Factor-product relationships in the fuel and additives market
The main material and product ﬂows in the gasoline complex are shown in Chart 1. Starting with the
factor inputs on the LHS, crude petroleum (Qo) is the main input into the reﬁnery. Several types of reﬁnery
gasoline (Qr) are produced and then blended into automobile fuel (Qs). Each type of reﬁnery gasoline has
unique qualities; some perform well (e.g., have high octane) in a gasoline engine but burn dirty from an
environmental viewpoint; some have moderate performance characteristics and burn clean; some have
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marginal performance characteristics and still burn dirty. Gasoline additives (Qp) are produced because
they have more desirable performance and/or environmental properties. The additives are blended into
motor gasoline, sometimes at slightly higher cost than other gasoline components, to improve the
characteristics of reﬁnery gasoline. Several input chemicals ðQ‘Þ are used in the production of additives.
Many of the input chemicals are byproducts of natural gas production. Others can be produced directly
from natural gas. The supply of some input chemicals is also supplemented by the byproducts of petroleum
reﬁning. Biomass (including corn) is also an input for one gasoline additive. In Chart 1, the natural gas and
biomass blocks are shown by dotted lines because these factors are implicit.
3. Supply and demand
Three sets of supply and demand functions are needed to specify a maximization problem and market
model: consumer demand, processing supply (marginal cost), and factor supply. The notation used for
market relationships, maximization constraints, and technology parameters is described in Tables 1, 2 and
Appendix Table 5.
Consumers require different gasoline grades according to the performance characteristics of their
automobile. The price-dependent demand function for grade i is
Psi ¼ asi  bsiQsi. (1)
No substitution between grades is assumed because technology deﬁnes an appropriate quality.
Fixed proportions production processes are adequate for this problem. Most additive processes combine
two or more chemicals to make a third chemical; they are ‘constructive’ processes. Hence the supply
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Chart 1. Factor-produced relationships in the gasoline/additives market.
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(marginal cost (MC)) function for additives processing is stated in terms of the production of the (one)
additive output. The processing supply curve for additive i is
MCpi ¼ api þ bpiQpi. (2)
The MC function includes wages and utilities but does not include the cost of material inputs. The cost of
the input chemicals, expressed on a per unit output basis, must be added to the processing to obtain the MC
of additive production. In the case of constant MC, the slope of the above supply function is zero ðbpi ¼ 0Þ:
A reﬁnery breaks a petroleum molecule into many smaller molecules, making several types of reﬁnery
gasoline. A reﬁnery has a ‘destructive’ process. Here, the supply (MC) for petroleum processing is stated in
terms of the (one) crude petroleum input:
MCop ¼ ao þ boQo. (3)
Again, this MC function does includes wages and utilities but excludes costs for material inputs.
A horizontal processing supply curve can occur in the short-run when all ﬁrms have the same tech-
nology (e.g., gasoline yield per barrel of petroleum) and factor prices, wages and utilities prices, are ﬁxed
because the processing sector is small relative to the labor and utilities markets. Otherwise, the short-run
processing supply curve is upward sloping if processing technology is heterogenous or if the processing
sector is large relative to the markets for labor, chemicals, or utilities. The short-run processing supply
curve becomes perfectly inelastic (vertical) at the point where a capacity constraint is reached, regardless, of
whether technology is heterogenous, or if the labor, chemicals, or utilities markets have inelastic supply
curves.
The reﬁnery is actually a collection of ﬁxed proportion production process (Gary and Handwerk, 1994).
Most of the choices concerning the product mix coming from a barrel of oil are set in the long-run period
when the conﬁguration of ﬁxed proportion production processes is chosen. The remaining choices in short-
run allocation decisions, the allocation of intermediate gas–oils for gasoline or diesel production, the sale or
internal use of residual fuel oil, and the proportion of kerosine in the gasoline mix do not vary widely from
year to year. Hence, the ﬁxed proportions assumption is a good ﬁrst approximation.
Most of the factor supply curves for additive inputs are likely upward sloping because they are the
byproducts of natural gas production. Further, domestic production of byproducts is supplemented by
imports. The price-dependent supply for additive input i is
P‘i ¼ a‘i þ b‘iQ‘i. (4)
For the moment, assume that the factor supply curves include one biomass based input for the production
of one additive. A processing complex for ethanol and a supply curve for crude petroleum will be important
for large simulation models of this sector. For now, they just add complexity without changing the basic
relationships developed here. Also, the price of crude petroleum (Po) is taken as exogenous.
4. Maximizing welfare
Sector welfare is consumer surplus less the operating and material costs associated with processing. The
objective function states consumer welfare as the area under the product demand curves. Processing costs
are given by the area under the appropriate processing supply function—processing costs for several
additives processes and the reﬁnery sector are given below. Factor costs for additive inputs are also given by
the area under the appropriate supply function. Finally, expenditures deﬁned by price times quantity are
used for crude petroleum, since the petroleum price is exogenous to the reﬁnery sector in this illustration.
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem also includes several constraints on sector welfare. Most
of these constraints are supply-utilization identities for the markets in the gasoline and additives sector. To
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illustrate performance and environmental constraints on the market, an octane constraint on blended
consumer gasoline is also included. The Lagrangian for an example is given in Eq. (5). There are three
gasoline products (say, regular, midgrade, and premium); three additive inputs (say, isobutane, propylene,
and corn); three additive processes (say, MTBE, alkylates, and ethanol); and three types of reﬁnery gasoline
(say, catalytic cracker, reformer, and coker). Further generalization is possible, but it becomes difﬁcult to
visualize properties for the maximization problem.
The Lagrangian for this problem is
L ¼
X3
i¼1
asiQsi 
bsi
2
Q2si
 

X3
i¼1
apiQpi þ
bpi
2
Q2pi
 

X3
i¼1
a‘iQ‘i þ
b‘i
2
Q2‘i
 
 aoQo þ
bo
2
Q2o
 
 PoQo
þ l1½Q‘1 þQ0x1  ðr11Qp1 þ r12Qp2 þ r13Qp3Þ þ l2½Q‘2 þQ0x2  ðr21Qp1 þ r22Qp2 þ r23Qp3Þ
þ l3½Q‘3 þQ0x3  ðr31Qp1 þ r32Qp2 þ r33Qp3Þ
þ m1½Qp1  ðZ11 þ Z12 þ Z13Þ þ m2½Qp2  ðZ21 þ Z22 þ Z23Þ þ m3½Qp3  ðZ31 þ Z32 þ Z33Þ
þ y4½Qoy1  ðZ41 þ Z42 þ Z43Þ þ y5½Qoy2  ðZ51 þ Z52 þ Z53Þ þ y6½Qoy3  ðZ61 þ Z62 þ Z63Þ
þ f1½ðZ11 þ Z21 þ Z31 þ Z41 þ Z51 þ Z61Þ Qs1
þ f2½ðZ12 þ Z22 þ Z32 þ Z42 þ Z52 þ Z62Þ Qs2
þ f3½ðZ13 þ Z23 þ Z33 þ Z43 þ Z53 þ Z63Þ Qs3
þ c1½ðO1Z11 þO2Z21 þO3Z31 þO4Z41 þO5Z51 þO6Z61Þ  K1Qs1
þ c2½ðO1Z12 þO2Z22 þO3Z32 þO4Z42 þO5Z52 þO6Z62Þ  K2Qs2
þ c3½ðO1Z13 þO2Z23 þO3Z33 þO4Z43 þO5Z53 þO6Z63Þ  K3Qs3. ð5Þ
A group of supply-utilization identities is deﬁned in Eq. (5) by Lagrange multipliers that have one Greek
letter and alternative subscripts. All constraint sets follow the inequality convention of programming
models for markets, namely, that supply equals or exceeds demand.
The constraints with multipliers li, i ¼ 1; 2; 3; state that the supply of a factor used in additive
production, Qli; is augmented by factor supply derived as a byproduct of petroleum production, Qoxi,
where xi is the byproduct yield from a unit of petroleum. Also, the production of additive i (Qpi) times the
input requirement of factor j in the production of additive i, rij, deﬁnes the derived demand for a particular
factor arising from a given additive. Hence, the total derived demand for an additive is the sum of input
requirements times production for each additive. Finally, supply from both sources equals or exceeds the
total derived demand for an input. The multipliers li represent the marginal contribution to net surplus
from another unit of additive-input supply.
The other supply constraints concern blending. The variable Zji indicates the amount of gasoline
component j used in product i. There are six gasoline components in the example. Components 1, 2, and 3
are gasoline additives. Components 4, 5, and 6 are types of reﬁnery gasoline. Blending is speciﬁed as a
costless activity here, but as the reader can verify, the main results are unchanged if a constant blending cost
term is added for each Zji.
The constraints with multipliers fi, i ¼ 1; 2; 3; state that the sum of the supply of gasoline components in
a particular grade of fuel, Zji, equals or exceeds the demand for each grade of fuel, Qsi, for i ¼ 1; 2; 3: The
multipliers fi represent the marginal contribution to net surplus from another unit of blended fuel supply.
The constraints with multipliers mi, i ¼ 1; 2; 3; state that the supply of additive i, Qpi, equals or exceeds the
sum of the demand for the additive across every grade of fuel, Zji, for j ¼ 1; 2; 3: The multipliers mi represent
the marginal contribution to net surplus of another unit of additive i supply.
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The equations with yi state that the supply of reﬁnery gasoline type i, Qoyi, equals or exceeds the sum of
the demand for the reﬁnery gasoline types across fuel grades, Zji, for j ¼ 4; 5; 6: The multipliers yi represent
the marginal contribution to net surplus of another unit of reﬁnery gasoline i.
Octane constraints illustrate the effects of performance or environmental restrictions. Each of these
equations, indicated by the Lagrange multipliers ci, for i ¼ 1; 2; 3; is also a supply-demand identity. Each
identity states that sum of the supply of octane (measured in, say, octane-gallons) provided to a given
gasoline grade by the sum of each blending component, OjZji, equals or exceeds the demand for octane in
the given gasoline grade, KiQsi. Oj indicates the octane content of a particular gasoline component. Kj
indicates the octane performance standard for a particular grade of gasoline. The multiplier li represents
the marginal contribution of another unit (octane-gallon) of octane supply to net sector welfare.1 In this
fashion, a quality regulation creates a demand for a scarce resource, creating additional value for the
gasoline components or additives with desired attributes, and perhaps destroying value of components
without much of the desired attribute.
5. First order conditions
The ﬁrst order conditions for highest net sector welfare are derivatives with respect to quantity variables
and Lagrange multipliers that are determined in the market and processing system. The ﬁrst order
conditions for the example are given below. Eqs. (6)–(10) are obtained by differentiating quantity variables.
Eqs. (11)–(15) are supply-demand identities or constraints obtained by differentiating with respect to
Lagrange multipliers. The identities are stated as inequalities that allow supply to be greater than or equal
to demand.
qL
qQsi
¼ ðasi  bsiQsiÞ  fi  ciKiX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (6)
qL
qQpi
¼ ðapi þ bpiQpiÞ  mi  ðl1r1i þ l2r2i þ l3r3iÞX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (7)
qL
qQ‘i
¼ ða‘i þ b‘iQ‘iÞ þ liX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (8)
qL
qQo
¼ ðao þ boQoÞ þ ðl1x1 þ l2x2 þ l3x3Þ þ ðy4y1 þ y5y2 þ y5y3Þ  PoX0, (9)
qL
qZij
¼  mi þ fj þ cjOiX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3,
¼  yi þ fj þ cjOiX0; i ¼ 4; 5; 6, ð10Þ
qL
qli
¼ Q‘i þQoxi  ðri1Qp1 þ ri2Qp2 þ ri3Qp3ÞX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (11)
qL
qmi
¼ Qpi  ðZi1 þ Zi2 þ Zi3ÞX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (12)
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qL
qyi
¼ Qoyo  ðZi1 þ Zi2 þ Zi3ÞX0; i ¼ 4; 5; 6, (13)
qL
qfi
¼ ðZ1i þ Z2i þ Z3i þ Z4i þ Z5i þ Z6iÞ QsiX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (14)
qL
qci
¼ O1Z1i þO2Z2i þO3Z3i þO4Z4i þO5Z5i þO6Z6i  KiQsiX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3. (15)
6. Market equilibrium
The maximum net welfare solution is the same as the market equilibrium for the sector, if the ﬁrst order
conditions for the maximum problem are also the equilibrium conditions for a market. This equivalence is
straightforward for input suppliers and processors. But a formal proﬁt-maximizing problem for the blender
must be presented to demonstrate equivalence at the retail level.
First consider input suppliers and processors. For the additive-input producers, direct inspection of Eq.
(8) suggests that the MC of inputs to additive production (the inverse supply equation) equals the marginal
beneﬁt (li) from using another unit of the additive-input. It is well known that MC also equals price in a
competitive input market, so Eq. (8) is also the market equilibrium condition. In other words, li ¼ P‘i:
Hence, in Eq. (7), the marginal value of additive production (mi) equals the sum of marginal processing
costs from the processing supply function plus factor costs (sum of input requirements in additive process i,
rij, times input prices, P‘j). Further the additive price less factor costs (processing margin) equals marginal
processing costs in competitive equilibrium.2 It follows that the additive price equals the marginal value of a
unit of additive supply, Ppi ¼ mi; in competitive equilibrium.
Similarly, Eq. (9) states that the marginal cost of petroleum processing equals the net marginal beneﬁt.
The MC comes directly from the petroleum processing equation. The beneﬁts from byproduct processing,
the sum of byproduct yields (xi) times shadow byproduct values (li), are actually revenues since li ¼ P‘i:
Further, revenues per unit of petroleum processed less the petroleum price (processing margin) equals
marginal processing cost in competitive equilibrium.3 Hence, yi ¼ Pri:
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2The proﬁt function for an additive processor includes revenues less commodity inputs less variable and ﬁxed costs (FC): ppi ¼
PpiQpi  ðPl1Ql1 þ Pl2Ql2 þ Pl3Ql3Þ  VCðQpiÞ  FC:
A quadratic variable cost (VC) function is consistent with the linear MC function: VCðQpiÞ ¼ apiQpi þ ðbpi=2ÞQ2pi:
Also, Qlj ¼ rjiQpi because of the ﬁxed proportions assumption about additive processors. So the proﬁt function becomes ppi ¼
MpiQpi  ðapiQpi þ ðbpi=2ÞQ2piÞ  FC; the margin is Mpi ¼ Ppi  ðPl1r12 þ Pl2r22 þ Pl3r33Þ: Under competition, processors maximize
proﬁts. So
qppi
qQpi
¼ Mpi  ðapi þ bpiQpiÞ ¼ 0 or Mpi ¼ api þ bpiQpi .
This equilibrium condition says that additive processors in a competitive market expand output until the processing margin equals
marginal cost.
3The proﬁt function for a petroleum processor includes byproduct and gasoline revenues less petroleum expenditures, operating
expenses and ﬁxed costs:
po ¼ ðPr1Qr1 þ Pr2Qr2 þ Pr3Qr3Þ þ ðP‘1Q‘1 þ P‘2Q‘2 þ P‘3Q‘3Þ  PoQo  VCðQoÞ  FC:
A quadratic VC function is consistent with the linear MC function:
VCðQoÞ ¼ aoQo þ ðbo=2ÞQ2o.
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For product pricing, consider a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm that buys reﬁnery gas and additives as inputs, and
then blends them. This marketing/blending ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts subject to several of the same constraints
present in the maximum welfare Eq. (5). Speciﬁcally, supply constraints for additives (mi), reﬁnery gas (yi),
and consumer gasoline blending (fi), and the quality constraint (ci) must all be satisﬁed. The constrained
proﬁt function is the revenues from sale of consumer grade gasoline less input expenditures for additives
and reﬁnery gasoline:
p ¼ ðPs1Qs1 þ Ps2Qs2 þ Ps3Qs3Þ  ðPp1Qp1 þ Pp2Qp2 þ Pp3Qp3Þ  ðPr1Qr1 þ Pr2Qr2 þ Pr3Qr3Þ
þ m1½Qp1  ðZ11 þ Z12 þ Z13Þ þ m2½Qp2  ðZ21 þ Z22 þ Z23Þ þ m3½Qp3  ðZ31 þ Z32 þ Z33Þ
þ y4½Qr1  ðZ41 þ Z42 þ Z43Þ þ y5½Qr2  ðZ51 þ Z52 þ Z53Þ þ y6½Qr3  ðZ61 þ Z62 þ Z63Þ
þ f1½ðZ11 þ Z21 þ Z31 þ Z41 þ Z51 þ Z61Þ Qs1
þ f2½ðZ12 þ Z22 þ Z32 þ Z42 þ Z52 þ Z62Þ Qs2
þ f3½ðZ13 þ Z23 þ Z33 þ Z43 þ Z53 þ Z63Þ Qs3
þ c1½ðO1Z11 þO2Z21 þO3Z31 þO4Z41 þO5Z51 þO6Z61Þ  K1Qs1
þ c2½ðO1Z12 þO2Z22 þO3Z32 þO4Z42 þO5Z52 þO6Z62Þ  K2Qs2
þ c3½ðO1Z13 þO2Z23 þO3Z33 þO4Z43 þO5Z53 þO6Z63Þ  K3Qs3. ð16Þ
The marketer’s choice variables are Qs1, Qs2, Qs3, Qp1, Qp2, Qp3, Qr1, Qr2, Qr3, and Zij.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the proﬁt maximizing marketer/blender are
qp
qQsi
¼ Psi  fi  ciKiX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (17)
qp
qQpi
¼ Ppi þ miX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (18)
qp
qQri
¼ Pri þ yiþ3X0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3, (19)
qp
qZij
¼  mi þ fj þ cjOiX0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3,
 yi þ fj þ cjOiX0; i ¼ 4; 5; 6. ð20Þ
These conditions are the same as the welfare maximizing conditions. In fact, Eq. (17) is identical to Eq. (6),
except that (17) contains one explicit price variable, while (6) contains the quantity dependent price
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Also, Qoyi ¼ Qri and Qoxi ¼ Qli because of the ﬁxed proportions assumption about petroleum processors. So the proﬁt function
becomes po ¼ MoQo  ðaoQo þ ðbo=2ÞQ2oÞ  FC; where the processing margin is
Mo ¼ ðP‘1x1 þ P‘2x2 þ P‘3x3Þ þ ðPr1y1 þ Pr2y2 þ Pr3y3Þ  Po.
Under competition, processors maximize proﬁts.
So
qpo
qQo
¼ Mo  ðao þ boQoÞ ¼ 0 or Mo ¼ ao þ boQo.
This equilibrium condition says that additive processors in a competitive market expand output until the processing margin equals
marginal cost. In the event that a long-run analysis is appropriate, the ﬁxed cost term in the proﬁt function is replaced with a term that
indicates the annual capital cost associated with an incremental unit of processing capacity. Then the MC term in the equilibrium
condition includes operating and capital costs.
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function. Both versions state that the marginal beneﬁt (price) of consumer gasoline equals or exceeds the
MC of producing another unit of consumer’s gasoline. In turn, the MC from (17) consists of two
components: the marginal value (fi) of another unit of blended gasoline supply and a quality adjustment
that reﬂects the value of another unit of octane supplied (ciKi).
Next, Eqs. (10) and (20) state that the marginal value of another unit of consumer gasoline (fj) equals the
marginal beneﬁt of the corresponding additive (mi) or reﬁnery gasoline (yi) less a correction for the value of
the octane provided by additive or reﬁnery gas i (ciOi).
Eqs. (18) and (19) merely assign a market price variable to a Lagrange multiplier. Eq. (18) states that
the additive price equals the marginal surplus contribution of an incremental additive unit. Eq. (19)
states that the reﬁnery gas price equals the marginal surplus contribution of an incremental unit of
reﬁnery gas.2,3
In the case where the quality constraint is not binding (ci ¼ 0), the producer and consumer price revert
to a more familiar form. Speciﬁcally, Eqs. (6) and (17) state that the marginal beneﬁt or price of another
unit of consumer gasoline equals the MC (fi). Meanwhile, Eqs. (10) and (20) state that the MC of
additive or reﬁnery gasoline i equals the MC of blended consumer gasoline of grade i. That is, the con-
sumer price of all gasoline grades are equal, and all additives and all types of reﬁnery gasoline have the
same price.
The welfare maximization problem identiﬁes a market equilibrium, then, regardless of whether a quality
restriction is present.
7. Product price and quality relationships
To investigate the price and quality relationships implied by market equilibrium, look at the marketer/
blender margin between the sales price of blended gasoline and the purchase price for additives or reﬁnery
gasoline. Begin with the Eq. (6) for grade j of blended consumer gasoline when the octane constraint is
binding:
Psj ¼ fj þ cjKj. (6)
Eq. (10) for additive type i is
fj ¼ Ppi  cjOi. (10)
Substituting yields and rearranging yields the marketing price relationship between consumer prices for
gasoline and the prices paid for additives:
Psj þ cjðOi  KjÞ ¼ Ppi. (21)
The second term on the left-hand side of the above equation deﬁnes a price premium (discount) that is paid
for an additive i that has an octane above (below) the standard for grade j (Kj). For instance, Oi ¼ 113 for
ethanol and Kj ¼ 87 for regular gasoline. If cj ¼ $:01=octane gallon, then the ethanol price (Ppj) will exceed
the price of regular gasoline (Psj) by $.52/gallon. A similar price relationship for the types of reﬁnery
gasoline can also be developed. The price for a low octane reﬁnery gasoline, like coker gas, would have a
price below blended consumer gasoline.
Usually, grade standards are associated with product performance or environmental attributes. Then the
multiplier cj represents a cost associated with producing quality. But standards are sometimes arbitrary. In
this context the shadow value times octane differential represents the subsidy equivalent of the quality
restriction for inputs having above average amounts of the restricted attribute. Similarly, the discount for
below average inputs represents a tax associated with the quality restriction.
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8. An example
An example helps to demonstrate tractability of the programming problem and to illustrate operation of
markets with a constraint. We now modify a trade example that includes factors and products from p. 143
of Takayama and Judge (1971). Three importing country demand equations from their example are used
for consumer gasoline demand in the new example. Similarly, three exporting country supply equations
from their example are used as equations of factor supply for the additives industry. Also, processing
supply functions for additives were added. The reference point values of the processing functions
corresponds to the magnitude of transport costs in the trade example. Then, a petroleum price and
processing function that were lower than the other factor supplies was included, and the intercepts of factor
supply equations were adjusted so that all factors and processes were used in the baseline solution. The
assumed parameter values for supply and demand functions are given in appendix Table 4.
The processing technology and quality assumptions correspond roughly to the actual reﬁnery and
additives processes. The yields of reﬁnery gasoline from petroleum roughly correspond to relative yields of
coker gasoline, catalytic cracker gasoline, and reformer gasoline. The octane assumptions, low, medium,
and high correspond to the same processes. The reﬁnery yields of inputs for additives processing roughly
correspond to the yields of iso-butane, butylene, and propylene from oil. There are three additives
processes. The ﬁrst process uses equal amounts of factors 1 and 2. The second additive process uses equal
amounts of all three factors. The third additive process uses only input three. Roughly, the ﬁrst two
processes correspond to the production of alkylates or polymer gasoline. The third process corresponds to
iso-octane or perhaps ethanol. The assumed octane values also correspond to alkylates, polymers, and
ethanol, respectively. The assumed parameter values for process yields, octane content, and octane
standards are given in Appendix B.
The results of two simulations are shown in Table 1. The right column shows the results of the market
simulation without the octane constraint. The left column shows the market simulation when the quality
constraint is imposed. The content of the simulations is interesting because it depicts the situation in the
additives and reﬁnery gasoline competition; the additives have more scarce qualities and higher quality
attributes than the reﬁnery qualities. Further, the average quality of the reﬁnery is below the performance
standard set in the constraint.
Now, look at how the quality standard affects the market. First, note that the price and production of
two additives increases, and total additive output increases (Table 2). Hence the price and quantity of all
inputs to additive production also increase. In contrast, the consumption of petroleum decreases and the
production of all types of reﬁnery gas also falls. However, the decline in output of reﬁnery gasoline is
smaller than the increase in output of gasoline additives (Table 2). Hence, the overall supply of gasoline to
consumers increases and the price for all grades of consumer gasoline falls, at least in this particular
example.4
The processing and marketing costs and returns are shown in Table 3. Three broad categories of
activities are organized. Notice and the expenditures on raw materials and processing costs match
intermediate product sales within one-half of one percent. Similarly, the intermediate product sales match
the revenues from sales of ﬁnal consumer products. Hence, the estimates show the processing and
marketing system doing business at cost, which one would expect in a competitive system.
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4One reason for the relatively small decline in reﬁnery output is that reﬁnery byproducts, whose prices are increasing with expansions
in additive outputs offset the price declines in reﬁnery gasolines. Further, additive output expansions are large because the input supply
elasticities for non-reﬁnery sources and additive processing are large. Actual markets may not exhibit a retail price decrease in response
to regulation because byproducts are less important in reﬁnery revenues and additive supply elasticities are relatively smaller.
Nonetheless, the example demonstrates that a general equilibrium analysis may yield conclusions that are different than the
conclusions that come from a ﬁrm’s analysis.
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Table 1
The effect of an octane standard on a hypothetical gasoline/additive sector
Variable description (example classiﬁcation) With constraint No constraint
NSP 669.544 672.101
Product (gasoline) consumption (Qs)
(Regular) s1 48.160 47.081
(Mid) s2 23.892 23.540
(Premium) s3 37.928 37.664
Processed product (additive) production (QP)
(MTBE) p1 28.463 21.291
(Alkylate) p2 10.318 19.428
(Ethanol) p3 20.807 15.812
Factor (nat. gas/chemical) supply ðQ‘Þ
(Butane) ‘1 13.437 12.744
(Butylene) ‘2 15.537 14.900
(Nat. gas) ‘3 20.955 18.967
Factor (petroleum) supply (QO) 172.518 167.975
Processed product (refinery) production (Qr)
(Cat. crack) r1 25.169 25.878
(Coker) r2 8.390 8.644
(Reformer) r3 16.780 17.252
Product (gasoline) consumer price (Ps)
s1 15.184 15.292
s2 15.222 15.292
s3 15.229 15.292
Product (gasoline) supply price (marginal cost) (fi)
s1 13.476 15.292
s2 13.476 15.292
s3 13.476 15.292
F.O.B. (additive) supply price (mi or Pp)
p1 15.522 15.292
p2 15.165 15.292
p3 15.616 15.292
F.O.B. (refinery gas) supply price (yi or Pr)
r1 14.790 15.292
r2 14.658 15.292
r3 15.165 15.292
Factor (chem/nat. gas) supply price ðli or P‘Þ
‘1 16.344 16.274
‘2 11.277 11.245
‘3 14.096 13.897
Processing margin, additive (Mpj)
p1 1.712 1.532
p2 1.258 1.486
p3 1.520 1.396
Processing margin, petroleum (Mo) 4.299 4.413
Value of octane constraint (Ci)
s1 0.012 0
s2 0.012 0
s3 0.012 0
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9. Extensions
Constrained welfare maximization is still consistent with market equilibrium under a more general set of
policy assumptions that apply to the fuel and additives markets.
Other types of quality constraints and fuel sector ﬁscal policies are particularly relevant. Additional
quality constraints, such as vapor, oxygen and benzene content give constrained welfare maximization
conditions that are similar to Eqs. (6)–(15) that have been discussed, except that a sum of shadow values of
quality constraints, instead of one shadow value, enter the ﬁrst order conditions. Nonlinear automobile
emission constraints deﬁned in the 1990 Clean Air Act (Federal Register, 1995) also give similar equilibrium
conditions, except that the partial derivative of a quality parameter with respect to a fuel type replaces the
attribute concentration of the fuel type in equilibrium conditions.
Two important ﬁscal policies in the gasoline fuel sector are the federal excise tax on gasoline
and the rebate, or blending credit, for using ethanol blends. Welfare maximization again turns out to be
consistent with market equilibrium, when the net revenue that the public sector extracts from the
gasoline and additives sector is subtracted from sector welfare. First, consider the excise tax. Suppose
the tax on consumer gasoline of grade i is Tsi. Then the government’s revenue for grade i gasoline
is TsiQsi.
Second, retailers receive a rebate of S $ for each gallon of grade i gasoline they sell that is a 10% ethanol
blend. Further, a prorated subsidy is given for gasoline that contains less than a 10% blend. Suppose Z3i is
the quantity of ethanol blended into gasoline of grade i. Then the subsidy per gallon of grade i gasoline is
(Z3i/Qsi) (1/0.1)S. Notice that the full subsidy is given when Z3i/Qsi equals 0.1 and is prorated
proportionately otherwise. The government expenditure, or more precisely the excise tax loss, associated
with the blending credit is (Z3i/0.1Qsi)SQsi or 10SZ3i, which suggests that the blending credit is equivalent
to a subsidy on additive 3 that is 10 times the rebate level in the gasoline market. Hence, the government’s
net revenue extraction from the fuel sector is the excise tax less the ethanol blending rebate, added across
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Table 2
Distribution of reﬁnery gasoline or additive j to consumer gasoline grade i (Zji)
From component j ¼ To grade i ¼ Total
s1 s2 s3
With quality constraint
p1 8.247 8.799 11.417 28.463
p2 0 10.318 0 10.318
p3 8.041 0 12.766 20.807 Additives 59.588
r1 15.075 4.775 5.345 25.195
r2 0 0 8.399 8.399
r3 16.797 0 0 16.797 Reﬁnery 50.391
Total 48.160 23.892 37.927 109.979
Without quality constraint
p1 15.567 0 5.724 21.291
p2 14.635 0 4.792 19.427
p3 12.827 0 2.984 15.811 Additives 56.529
r1 0 10.988 14.890 25.878
r2 4.051 4.575 0 8.626
r3 0 7.981 9.274 17.255 Reﬁnery 51.759
Total 47.080 23.544 37.664 108.288
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gasoline grades.
E ¼
X3
i¼1
T siQsi  10S
X3
i¼1
Z3i: (22)
When the revenue extraction is subtracted from the sector welfare function in the Lagrangian, the revised
ﬁrst order conditions give standard results for taxes and subsidies on market prices. For instance, the term
Tsi is subtracted from the LHS of the ﬁrst order condition (6). This gives the standard result for an excise
tax in the market, namely, that the producer price plus the excise tax (and quality adjustment) equals the
consumer price. Similarly, the LHS of Eq. (10) for additive 3 now add the term 10S.
Finally, a revised marketing margin from additive 3 to gasoline grade i that reﬂects the effects of the
value of quality and the subsidy can be derived. Combining Eq. (6) and additive 3’s Eq. (10) gives
Psi ¼ Pp3  ð10S  T siÞ  ciðO6  KiÞ. (23)
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Table 3
Processing and marketing costs and revenues
Purchase raw materials and pay for processing costs
Price Crude oil input quantity Revenue
1 167.975 167.975
Pop Qo
4.299 167.975 722.1245
Pp Qp
1.172 28.463 33.359
1.258 10.318 12.980
1.52 20.807 31.627
P‘ Q‘
16.344 13.437 219.614
11.277 15.537 175.211
14.096 20.955 295.382
Sum 1658.272
Sell ﬁnal consumer products
Ps Qs Revenue
15.184 48.16 731.262
15.222 23.892 363.684
15.229 37.92 577.484
Sum 1672.429
Sell intermediate products (additives and reﬁnery gas)
Pp Qp Revenue
15.222 28.463 433.2638
15.165 10.318 156.473
15.616 20.807 324.922
Pr Qr
14.79 24.169 357.460
14.658 8.39 122.981
15.165 16.78 254.469
Sum 1649.567
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Since additive 3 has the blending credit, the producer price of additive three will likely be above the
consumer gasoline price by (10 times) the amount that the blending credit exceeds the excise tax. The
additive quality adjustment also holds the additive price above the consumer gasoline price, as before.
10. Summary and conclusions
The markets for factors, processing and consumption in a sector of an economy are amenable to
mathematical programming analysis. It was shown that markets provide the best possible outcome, in the
sense of maximizing sector welfare, in the presence of the performance and environmental constraints that
characterize the gasoline fuel industry. For ﬁscal measures such as excise taxes and ethanol blending credits,
the sector welfare function must be reduced to account for the government extraction of revenue from the
sector. Even then, the net welfare maximizing conditions are still the market equilibrium conditions.
Indeed, the model is general enough to apply to any sector that includes raw commodity supply,
processing, and quality regulation of a blended consumer product. Other applications for product
standards on protein content in the formulae feed industry, or fat content standards in consumer foods,
could be based on this programming model provided that details of the processing sector are revised. An
operational second best principle, that the market provides the highest welfare given the quality-constraint
imposed by a product standard or government regulation, is general.
The quality-constrained welfare maximum will likely be less than the welfare maximum without the
constraint. However, the standard may be justiﬁed by external environmental or safety beneﬁts whose
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Then regulation could improve welfare in the broadest sense,
when external environmental or product safety beneﬁts are explicit.
Nonetheless, this programming model provides a useful method for describing price and market
equilibriums of value added markets in the presence of changing regulation. For instance, we shed light on
the market effects of quality regulations; a standard provides a price incentive to expand output of additives
and reﬁnery gasolines with the desired attributes, and a disincentive to the output of gasoline components
with less desirable attributes. As the example simulation suggests, then it is possible that a modiﬁed
consumer price increase, or even a price decrease, could accompany a quality restriction when the elasticity
of supply for additives is large enough to offset the declining output of reﬁnery gasoline.
We also showed that an additive prices above the consumer product according to that additive’s
contribution in ﬁlling a product standard deﬁcit. In the ethanol–gasoline example, competitive additive
prices are also held above gasoline (product) prices because of the blending credit.
The programming approach is tractable for applied market analyses of changing product and
environmental standards in value-added sectors. The solution process for the example was routine and
results were generally sensible. Clearly, more factors, processes and products are required for realism. Also,
elasticity estimates of factor supply, processing, and product demand in a particular country could improve
the empirical content of simulation results. The multiple, nonlinear environmental constraints of the fuel
sector are also important. But the market effects of new quality regulations can be evaluated with this
programming model when limited data and no experience with a new regulation precludes econometric
analysis.
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Appendix A
The supply and demand parameters are given in Table 4.
Appendix B
The technology and quality parameters are given in Table 5.
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Table 4
Supply and demand parameters
Processed (oil) services supply
ao ¼ 0:1 bo ¼ 0:025 Po ¼ 1:0
Factor (chemical) supply
a‘1 ¼ 15:0 b‘1 ¼ 0:01
a‘2 ¼ 15:0 b‘2 ¼ 0:05
a‘3 ¼ 15:0 b‘3 ¼ 0:1
Product (gasoline) demand
as1 ¼ 20:0 bs1 ¼ 0:1
as2 ¼ 20:0 bs2 ¼ 0:2
as3 ¼ 20:0 bs3 ¼ 0:125
Processed (additives) services supply
ap1 ¼ 1:0 bp1 ¼ 0:025
ap2 ¼ 1:0 bp2 ¼ 0:025
ap3 ¼ 1:0 bp3 ¼ 0:025
Table 5
Technology and quality parameters
Octane standard by grade of gasoline
K1 ¼ 91
K2 ¼ 93
K3 ¼ 95
Octane content of gasoline components
R1 70
R2 63
R3 90
P1 109
P2 90
P3 114
Refining gasoline yields per unit of oil processed
y1 ¼ 0:15
y2 ¼ 0:05
y3 ¼ 0:10
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Table 5 (continued )
Refining gasoline yields per unit of oil processed
Refinery by product yields per unit of oil processed
x1 ¼ 0:025
x2 ¼ 0:0125
x3 ¼ 0:020
Requirement rij of input ‘i per unit output of additives type pj
Additive
Input r1 r2 r3
‘1 0.5 0.33 0.0
‘2 0.5 0.33 0.0
‘3 0.5 0.34 1.0
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